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Bulletin de l'APAD
The Rural Councillor as
Development Agent : An Uneasy
Connection ? A Report from Senegal
Bernhard Venema
1 The rural council in Senegal is commissioned to play an important role in development.
The council is the formal authority to decide on land distribution and land disputes. In
addition, it is authorized to collect the yearly head tax and market fees and to decide
which collective utilities or projects will be financed. In every arrondissement there is a
technical team, the staff of the 'Centre d'Expansion Rural’ (CER), which has been created to
assist  the  council  in  planning  and  implementation.  In  the  case  of  development
interventions by outsiders in the jurisdiction of the council, it has at least the right to be
informed and to propose suggestions. One can say that in the arrondissement the field of
development  agencies  is  composed  of  non‑governmental  organizations  and
semi‑government agencies as the external actors, the rural council as actor at the level of
the rural community, local groups and associations at the village level and the CER as
supporting actor at the level of the arrondissement. The council, thus, seems to have a
crucial linkage position between the village and higher level.
2 In development theory it is argued that decentralization of government administration
and  participation  of  the  local  population  in  development  will  result  in  higher
performance than top down planning and implementation. Therefore, in most African
states the government's role in economic development has been curtailed. At the same
time government organization has become more decentralized while there is more room
for manoeuvre for rural councils and NGOs. Thus, in practice councils should indeed be
able to act as a development agency. Many councillors maintain that they are able to
work properly. According to one author, many Senegalese councils are democratically
organized and the councillors are able to work independently and to remain in touch
with their constituency. The real problems are financial ones (Sy 1996).
3 Looking at local elected bodies from a scientific point of view, the prospects are more
gloomy. In Africa most central governments are not so much interested in the well‑being
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of their citizens as in maintaining privileged positions for themselves and their clients. In
order to keep the system running,  favours are exchanged for political  support.  Such
neopatrimonial  political  systems  are  characterized  by  clientalism which pervades  ail
political life ; as a consequence, a great part of government resources are withdrawn from
public services.
4 Social  scientists  argue  that  Senegal's  political  system must  be  analysed  in  this  way.
Although Senegal may have a long tradition of multiparty democracy, this is not relevant
for this discussion. Such formal issues may be stressed in political propaganda, essential
however is the fact that the political system has not been changed. In their overview of
the political systems in Africa, Buijtenhuijs and Thiriot (1995 :13) conclude that in the
absence of a political culture of participation and accountability, multiparty democracy is
likely to remain confined to competition among the political elite. As regards Senegal,
they  argue  that  the  democratic  structures  simply  have  been  grafted  onto  the
neo‑patrimonial structures (see also Kante 1994, Diop 1993, Coulon and Cruise O'Brien
1989).
5 So the devolution of authority to democratic elected councils seems to be no more than a
superficial  issue which maintains the political  relations.  Borhaug (1994)  argues in an
interesting annotated bibliography that decentralization and democracy effect the local
balance of power. This means that government staff and politicians will do everything to
maintain their position, which may even result in clientalism increasing in importance.
6 The scientific perspective is common among those who have critically examined the role
of the Senegalese rural councils. Thus Blundo argues, that the government officials and
party politicians are able to manipulate the council, which results into a clientalistic use
of the resources of the council. As a consequence farmers have a negative opinion of the
council and they try to keep it at bay (1991 :  124, 1995 :  77).  Due to factionalism and
rivalry councillors may even block peasant leaders who wish to start  a  development
project in the community. He concludes that farmers associations and local councils do
not contribute to the resurgence of civil society, as is often argued. This he considers to
be ill‑founded optimism as these institutions function according to a clientalistic logic
(1995 : 96). In the same way Gellar views the rural council. According to him, the villagers
regard the councils as highly politicized institutions which use their power and resources
to reward those co‑operating with the state and the ruling party (1996 :  19,  see also
Lachenmann,  1990).  These  scholars  have  in  common  the  idea  that  local  political
institutions are the domain of political entrepreneurs who act in a self‑interested manner
and are able to achieve their aims.
7 The  analysis  of  these  scholars  is  based  on  anthropological  theories  called
transactionalism,  exchange  theory,  network  analysis,  and  actor  theory.  The  guiding
analytical  concepts  are actor,  networks,  transactions,  brokers,  the notion of  multiple
realities,  and arenas of  struggle.  This theoretical approach denounces the 'populistic'
approach  which  sees  the  'community'  as  homogeneous :  the  various  interests  and
opportunities within local society must have ample attention. Local brokers are the social
actors who operate as intermediaries in the local arena trying to bring different parties
together and by doing so, trying to improve their position (Bierschenk and Olivier de
Sardan 1993).
8 However, in this type of analysis actors are sometimes viewed as political entrepreneurs,
whose decisions are shaped by self‑interest and careerism only. What is disregarded is the
fact that actors also have to act according to local considerations of what is appropriate
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in the particular context. In villages where people have lived together for decades, local
control mechanisms and old patterns of prestige and co‑operation are most likely still
operative. The authors who define the Senegalese state as clientalistic, admit at the same
time that there are many local mutual aid mechanisms based on kin, neighbourhood,
caste, and marabout‑taalibe relationship (Gellar 1996, Coulon and Cruise O'Brien 1989).
These authors admit that traditional control mechanisms continue to function too and
that these influence political behaviour of the councillors. For example, they state that
councillors  deliberate  with  the  village  head  and  eider  before  a  decision  on  land
distribution is taken. Thus, implicitly they admit that the rural councillor is not only
related upwards in a clientalistic fashion to government officials but that he has to take
local authority patterns into account as well.
9 Long (1992), one of the founders of the social actor and agency theory in development
sociology,  argues  that  ail  societies  contain  a  repertoire  of  different  life  styles  and
rationalities which they utilize in their search for order and meaning. In this context,
Olivier de Sardan speaks about different stocks de représentations ; generalizing from one
stock  only  resulting  in  unacceptable  stereotypes  (1995 :  70).  It  is  therefore  useful  to
distinguish between views and expectations villagers have of political life at national and
regional level and views as regards local politicians. Politicians at the wider lever are
believed  to  act  as  entrepreneurs  who  manipulate  kinship  and  neighbourhood  in  a
clientalistic fashion, which eventually results in disappointment and frustration on the
side of the clients. Politicians at the village level are believed to act according to local
criteria of prestige and legitimacy too. So the village consensuelle, in the words of Olivier de
Sardan, may not be a stereotype but is often a realistic description of what is observed.
According to Blundo, peasant leaders must be cultural insiders to attract a following, and
we would apply this to councillors too.
10 In the context of this discussion I want to examine the role of the council of Kaymor as a
development agency. I will also analyse if individual councillors operate as development
brokers.
The rural community of Kaymor, arrondissement Medina Sabakh
11 The arrondissement Medina Sabakh is situated in the southern part of the Kaolack region.
The total  area  of  the  arrondissement  is  601  km2 and it  has  32.892  inhabitants  1.  The
majority of  the population belongs to the Wolof  ethnie group (86 %),  the others are
Toucouleur, Peulh or otherwise (Seck 1995).
12 The arrondissement is composed of three rural communities (communauté rurale), Kaymor,
N'Gayene en Medina Sabakh. Each community counts several tens of villages : 23, 23 and
58 respectively. The villages are relatively small, the average number of inhabitants is
merely 316. Every rural community has a council, with an office in the central village. The
villages are not far away from the central village, the maximum distance is no more than
10 km. The council of Kaymor officially has 24 members, but since the election of 1990
two members have died. In principle, a third of the councillors are designated by the
members  of  the  local  sections  of  the  co‑operative  of  Kaymor.  In  the  community  of
Kaymor there are nine sections, six have a representative (désigné) in the council 2.
13 The yearly rainfall in the arrondissement varies between 500 and 900 mm. Through the
area  runs  a  secondary branch of  the  Gambia  river,  the  Bao‑Bolong,  which itself  has
tertiary affluents. When the rainfall is high, the shallow parts of the land (bas‑fonds) may
become pools with water after the rainy season. Agriculture and cattle husbandry are the
The Rural Councillor as Development Agent : An Uneasy Connection ? A Report f...
Bulletin de l'APAD, 12 | 1996
3
main sources of livelihood. The clearance of land and the need for firewood finished the
forest off : there only remains astate forest (forêt classée) of 1900 ha..
14 The first  settlers  in  the area were probably  Toucouleur.  To this  day the community
counts old Toucouleur centres as Diama Thiewie, but there are also Toucouleur villages
recently created. The first Wolof settled in the area probably in the 17th century. They
were from Manding origin, but became wolofised during the course of time. The Cisse and
Toure families are among those who settled long ago and who were hot gospellers of the
Islam.  They  founded  the  villages  Kaymor,  Thysse‑Kaymor,  Pacala,  N'Dau  and  others.
These families were and still are quite influential in the area.
15 The Cisse and Toure families were from the class of the freebom (diambour). They were
engaged in agriculture and cattle husbandry. Their clients were families from the class of
artisans (nieenio) who made the necessary farm implements and leatherwork. These were
sidelines, as agriculture was their main occupation. In addition, these families had slave
families (diam) who did most of the agricultural labour. They worked for their master five
mornings a week,  the remaining time tilling their  own fields and herding their  own
cattle. No social class was excluded from entitlement to land.
16 After the pacification of Saloum in 1887, the French colonial government left the social
hierarchy  untouched.  Only  after  internal  warfare  was  ended  and  the  cultivation  of
groundnut had become common, the government propagated that domestic slaves should
no longer work for their master and start completely for themselves. In Saloum slaves
from elsewhere established themselves as farmer or labourer at the railways from the
1920's onwards.
17 Many  Mouride  marabouts  have  profited  from  the  situation  to  found  a  religious
community (dara) in Saloum, which attracted many followers from slave origin (Klein
1993 : 185). They were accorded their own plots after having worked for the marabout a
number of years. Especially the marabout family Serign Aliou Seck founded many dara in
the arrondissement which now have developed into actual villages as Padaf and Darou
Khoudos. At this moment dara are no longer founded. Instead of working several years
for their marabout, his followers help to cultivate his farm a number of days each year.
18 In Medina Sabakh, the slaves left their master only in the thirties in order to become
independent farmers. Most ex‑slaves preferred to live in their original village or in a
hamlet nearby. People still know the master‑slave relations, which are reconfirmed in the
exchange of presents at ceremonies, where the person higher in rank are obliged to give
more generously.
19 So the economic emancipation of the slaves seems not to have changed the social
ranking.  Each  class  has  its  own  residential  quarter  and  marries  endogamously.  The
diambour  are  those  of  highest  status.  They  occupy  the  local  political  and  religious
positions because they are the founders of the villages and the descendants of families of
marabout origin. Until today, ail village heads, Imams and teachers in the local Koranic
schools are freebom ; however, this is not the case in villages without diambour.
20 Next in rank are the diam. They marry endogamously, but freebom sometimes marry a
diam woman. Diambour men sometimes marry a slave‑bom woman as their fifth wife ; in
that case the children inherit their status from their mother. It happens occasionally that
a freebom redeems a slave woman before marrying her ; in that case the children inherit
the class of their father.
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21 Lowest  in  rank are  the  craftsmen (nieenio) :  the  leatherworkers,  the  blacksmiths  and
minstrels. Their main activity is agriculture, however. The nieenio only marry within their
group, a marriage with a person from a different class is taboo. Of the total population in
the community of Kaymor, as in the arrondissement, about half is freebom, about half is
slave‑bom and about ten percent is artisan.
22 In daily life social ranking is not evident. Taboos to communicate across one's class are
therefore absent and people of different class are friends who can co‑operate. Compared
to a generation ago it is now not appropriate to refer to class. We will take a closer look at
this in order to see if social class affects membership of the rural council.
Decentralization in Medina Sabakh
23 Till 1983 government policy in this area was mainly directed to production increase by
agricultural extension and the supply of production credit. The government departments
at the countryside co‑operated in rural extension centres, the Centres d'Expansion Rurale
(CER), a sort of multidisciplinary team for rural development. This team was located in
the headquarters of each arrondissement, mostly composed of an agricultural extension
worker,  a  veterinary  assistant,  a  forestry  agent,  a  home  economist  agent,  and  a
co‑operative assistant. In the headquarters of the district (département) there was also
some government staff to help the field agents in their work.
24 It is a common view that CER hardly contributed to agricultural development (Vengroff
and Johnston 1985, Ba 1985, Kante 1993). In the first place this was due to the very limited
size of the field staff.  A calculation of the number of field staff in 1964 resulted in a
density of only one fieldworker for every 15.500 inhabitants.  Secondly, there was the
chronic lack of transport facilities to visit the villages. In addition, part of the work of CER
was administrative, such as the registration of credit supply or the checking of illegal
woodcutting in the state forests. For these and other reasons the CER staff lacked the
motivation to work properly.
25 For  agricultural  development  the  regional  development  organizations  were  more
important ;  in Saloum this was the Société  de  Développement  et  de  Vulgarisation Agricole
(SODEVA). SODEVA was a donor‑financed agency focusing on groundnut production. It
aimed to increase production by means of an intensive extension program. The village
co‑operative which handled the groundnuts granted the credit to buy seed, fertilizer and
farm implements. Next to SODEVA there was also an agency (SODECOTON) that promoted
the cultivation of cotton using the same approach.
26 This  'interventionist  approach'  did  increase  agricultural  production.  However,  the
farmers became indebted by the volume of production credit in combination with crop
failures  due  to  low rainfall  (Venema  1978 :  68‑71).  The  farmers  could  not  pay  their
instalments  and the  co‑operatives  went  bankrupt.  In  1984,  as  part  of  the  Structural
Adjustment  Policy,  the  co‑operatives  lost  their  buying  monopoly  and  the  umbrella
organization, the Office National de Coopération et d'Assistance du Developpement (ONCAD),
was dissolved. From now on the co‑operative only delivered seed and fertilizer on credit
and only after a large down payment. Another policy was the discontinuation of SODEVA
and other regional intervention agencies. Henceforth the idea was that the population
itself  had  to  initiate  activities  in  order  to  obtain  certain  goals.  The  CER  no  longer
contacted the population, but now the reverse was required.
27 The government stimulated the population to form other associations in addition to the
sections  villageoises.  The  CER  and  the  rural  councils  summoned  to  set  up groups
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(groupements).  This  would facilitate their  own work and increase the likelihood to be
approached by NGOs. The groupements were rather loose associations lacking any juridical
status. Some had a saving deposit on a bank, which they could use to buy seed or farm
implements, but they had no other official status. However, the CER and councils also
propagated the founding of more formal organizations ; since the law of 11 May 1984
Groupements d'lnterêt Economique (GIE) could be created. Several people could unite for a
common economic goal on a voluntary basis. After having been registered at court and
after a large down payment, the GIE was allowed to borrow money at the bank.
28 As part of the decentralization policy, a council was elected in each rural community in
the region in 1974.  These councils  had three important tasks.  In the first  place they
became responsible for the allocation of land. Formerly this had been the responsibility of
the village head and the founding families. The council even has the right to expropriate
land. According to a government decree, land that has been left unused for three years
could be taken over by the council. Apart from land used for agriculture, the council also
supervises the common pastures. Since the code of 4 February 1993 it may even make
proposals to the subdistrict officer (sous‑préfect) to exploit state forests.
29 The second task of the council is to collect the head tax and decide how to use it for
development purposes. Every person between 14 and 60 years old is required to pay tax,
1000 fCFA per person. With this money the council finances the reparation of wells, the
building of classrooms and so on. Until 1990 the state had retained tutelary powers over
the council, but after the Administrative Reform of 1990 this has been abolished. The
budget is now administrated by the council itself. Lastly, the council has to make village
residential plans and decide on cattle tracks.
30 While the role of government in development decreased, the number of NGOs in the area
increased. One of the first NGOs in the area was Caritas, with its headquarters in Kaolack.
Since the sixties the American Peace Corps started to work in the district. The past ten
years several NGOs and semi‑government agencies (QUANGOs) have however started to
work  in  the  arrondissement :  Africare,  POGV,  PNVA,  SODEVA,  ISRA  and  the  Mission
Norvegienne 3. The NGOs are located in the headquarters of the arrondissement, Medina
Sabakh. We estimate that about 35 of the 104 villages have links with these NGOs and
QUANGOs 4. In the community Kaymor only Kaymor, Passy Kaymor, ThysseKaymor, keur
Dianko, keur Bacary, keur Samba Die, and Sonkorong are involved. Most NGO activities
take place in the community Medina Sabakh where they have their office.
31 As argued in the introduction, the council has a crucial linkage position between the
village  level  where  groups  and GIEs  are  active  and the  higher  level  where  the  CER,
QUANGOs and NGOs are operating. However, it remains to be seen whether it makes this
linkage effective.
The composition of the council
32 The size of the council depends on the number of inhabitants in the rural community,
ranging from 16 up to 28 members.  The rural council of Medina Sabakh is,  however,
larger than officially allowed (29 instead of 28).
33 The local party branches propose candidates for the election list, but the final decision is
taken by the party leaders of the département. Two criteria were mentioned as being the
most important to become elected : political activity in the party and a good reputation of
the candidate in the community.
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34 The actual members of the council of Kaymor are all members of the government party,
the Parti Socialist (PS). This has been the case since the election of the first council in 1974.
The PS has always had most of the votes in the countryside and the 'winner takes ail
system' entails that it could occupy ail seats 5. At the end of the eighties other parties
became more important. However, in 1990 the opposition parties boycotted the election
and again the PS could monopolize the council. In theory it is still possible that members
of other parties can be elected as a councillor, in fact as a désigné, but in Kaymor this was
not the case.
35 The council reflects the composition of the local population. The rule is that government
staff cannot figure as a candidate. Neither the local extension workers nor the teachers
were a councillor. The advantage of this practice is that the council reflects the interest of
the autochtonous population, the disadvantage is that those with a broader vision, as for
example the teachers, cannot be active as councillor 6.
36 The local autochtonous population also adheres to this practice because they themselves
deny the Peulh from Guinea access to the council. These Peulh started as navetane in the
area, but some have now settled themselves as shopkeepers. Although they are among
the most wealthy, for the moment being they are still considered strangers. Even if they
are party‑members, they are not elected in the council.
37 Youngsters  and women are clearly underrepresented.  Since the election of  1990,  the
party has for the first time accepted the principle that women and young men can be on
the list. In Kaymor the council members included one woman and one young man.
38 Meanwhile, the woman has deceased and has not yet been replaced and the young man is
in his mid‑30s, between men over 60 years old and one man in his forties 7. Once again,
local criteria of ranking determine access to the council.
39 The use of locally accepted rules of ranking also appears from the fact that village heads
have been elected as councillor. The council of Kaymor counts four village heads among
its members.
40 As has been stated, the party ultimately decides who can run as councillor. To have local
support, the party has made sure that the candidates are from different villages of the
community. The councillors of Kaymor have been selected from the following villages :
Kaymor : 4, Sonkorong : 3, Ndimbe Birane : 2, Samba Die : 2, twelve villages : each 1. From
this it follows that 15 from the 23 villages have a representative in the council. The larger
villages have one representative in the council (Couloumbodou, Thysse‑Kaymor and keur
Bacary), or more than one (Kaymor, Sonkorong) 8.
41 The composition of the council of Kaymor reflects the class division in the community.
The  council  counts  9  diambour,  11  diam,  and  two  members  without  specific  class
distinction. Five slave‑bom members are designés who have less prestige than the elected
councillors. In other councils the diambour are quite often over represented 9. Apparently
exceptions  as  in  Kaymor  do  occur  which  means  that  party  politicians  attach  less
importance to these traditional criteria of ranking.
42 In addition, people who are not Wolof have access to the council. Thus, the council of
Kaymor  has  4  Peulh  and  1  Serer  as  a  member.  However,  the  Toucouleur  are  not
represented in the council.  As was the case for social  class,  ethnic origin is less well
represented in Medina Sabakh 10.
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43 I  can conclude that  the council  does  not  necessarily  reflect  the official  directives  as
regards repartition between numbers of élus and designés. In addition, local criteria of
ranking are taken into account. Village heads and eider of the autochtonous families are
the backbone of the council. In the words of Blundo (1991 : 131), the council is essentially
composed of ainés sociaux. What is clearly particular, is that also the lower classes and
ethnic minorities are represented in the council. These criteria of stratification seem to
lose some of their importance, but how developments will be in the future is not clear.
The tendances in the council : factionalism or personal preferences ?
44 Knowing what criteria are taken into account to become elected as a councillor, I will now
look into the operation of the council. It appears that the functioning of the council is
hampered by factionalism and the misuse of funds. This has also been established by
other authors (Blundo 1991, Savané 1983).
45 After the PS took ail seats in the last local elections in 1990, most rural councils were split
up into two or more tendances. This means that some councillors have ties with party
leader A and others with party leader B. Both party leaders have relations with politicians
at a higher level. The tendances have nothing to do with political arguments. What seems
important is to have good connections.
46 The  council  of  Kaymor  is  divided  into  tendance  A  (15  members)  and  tendance  B  (7
members).  The leader of tendance A at the level of the département is Samou Toure, a
government official  who has connections with Moustapha Niasse,  minister of  Foreign
Affairs.  The  leader  of  tendance  Bis  Modou  A'Bass  Ba,  a  member  of  parliament  and
ex‑minister.  The  phenomenon  of  tendances  results  into  rivalries  and  situations  of
stalemate. No wonder several people do not in any way wish to be involved with the
council.
A. Casus : the opinion of the secretary of a daira
47 The secretary of a religious organization (daira) asked one of the authors to help the daira 
so that it could undertake income‑generating activities.  He did not want to have any
relationship with the council : "The council is only interested in politics. Sound criteria
are not important at all. What is the case is that those of the same tendance collaborate in
order to cash in advantages. That is the reason I don't want to have anything to do with
the council". However, this did not prevent him being a member of the PS. He told us that
he was party‑member because he did not want to become isolated.
48 NGO representatives may decide not to work in a village because of the conflicts between
tendances. The councillors of the village Medina Sabakh opposed each other in such a way
that an NGO agent decided in 1995 to work in this village no longer but rather in smaller
villages (Bierman 1995 : 51). However, she also mentioned that the man preferred to work
in small surveyable villages.  In 1995, USAID started with the preparations for a large
project  on  natural  resource  management  in  the  area  in  which  it  would  involve  the
population, other NGOs and the council. USAID has, however, avoided close collaboration
with  the  council.  Although  USAID's  policy  is  officially  to  link  up  with  government
institutions, in practice they decided to work together with a management committee
with a weak link to the council.  In this committee three councillors are active 11.  In
Medina Sabakb, however, two NGOs co‑operate with the council, for example in selecting
the villages (Bierman 1995 : 51, 55).
49 Factionalism does not only occur in the council but also in the organizations that have
political ties, such as the co‑operative.
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B. Casus : the co‑operative of Kaymor
50 The chairman of the co‑operative of Kaymor occupied his position from the very first
51 beginning. Because of his long and good record and age he was a man of high standing.
When he felt he grew too old to continue the job he announced that he intended to
withdraw. However, the other members of the board insisted that he should continue to
hold his position : should he withdraw, the co‑operative would become the domain of
conflicts between the two tendances. When it became known that he intended to resign,
one of the tendances had in fact tried to obtain a majority in the board. The chairman had
no other choice than remain in office.
52 Because councillors also founded groupements and GIEs, groups may be used as political
assets as well.
C. Casus : the two women's groups in Kaymor
53 The second groupement feminin of Kaymor was established in 1991, officially because the
village was too large for one group only. However, the fact that councillors of the same
tendance were suspected to have embezzled the returns of the millet mill had been more
important. Although the theft was not proven, a number of dynamic women started a
second group, directed by a councillor of the other tendance. The women remember this
period with some bitterness. "Now everything is peaceful", says the chairwoman of the
second  group.  Is  this  remark  somehow  directed  at  the  arrival  of  USAID  on  the
development scene of which it is known that they only invest in people who work in
harmony with each other ?
54 Personal ambitions and sympathies also play a role in how the council is conceived. The
chairman of the religious association is the same person of whom land had been taken by
the council (see section 7). He made it clear on several occasions that he personally had a
bad experience with the council. However, if other people wanted to join in, he would
correct them because, according to hi m, they had nothing to complain of. puzzled, We
asked him why he held a brief for the council. He explained that some people liked to
complain about the council in front of foreigners, but that they had nothing to complain
about. Apparently, critisizing the council is part of personal strategies.
D. Casus : a personal strategy of the councillor of N'Dakhar
55 As most councillors, the vice‑chairman belonged to tendance A. However, he suddenly
switched over to tendance B. He explained that his son had caused an accident with his
taxi de brousse and had lost his driving license. He had therefore visited the party leader of
tendance A to discuss the return of the driving license. The party leader did not want to
receive him in his office. He then decided to become a member of tendance B.
56 Apparently  the  division  into  factions  inhibits  the  activities  of  the  council.  However,
factionalism is not based on structural divisions within the rural community. Shift are
easily made and people could cite several examples. Therefore, the presence of tendances 
does not prevent the population to co‑operate in many ways, as for example in building
new  mosques.  Notwithstanding  the  existence  of  tendances,  other  social  control
mechanisms do continue to operate as well.
The council as development promoter
57 Decentralization may imply that development activities are now promoted by individuals
who lack the capacity to do this properly. For Senegal the government takes the view that
the council can act as a promoter because it is assisted by the CER. However, as already
argued, the CER is not capable of assisting sufficiently. Nowadays most CERs have a car at
The Rural Councillor as Development Agent : An Uneasy Connection ? A Report f...
Bulletin de l'APAD, 12 | 1996
9
their disposition, but a CER has a budget which allows him to buy only 600 litre of diesel a
year. It is clear that the CER can hardly reach the villages in the arrondissement at all.
Therefore the CER turns to the council  for a contribution to the travelling expenses.
However, this can hardly be considered to solve the problem.
58 The council indeed has a budget of its own in order to finance activities approved by the
council.  The budget is relatively small and part of it disappears as fixed costs 12.  The
councils are therefore not in a position to spend large amounts on travelling expenses.
That is why most councils have appointed their own committees to do the real work, such
as  managing  a  millet  mill  or  supporting  the  anti‑bushfire  campaign.  Quite  often  a
councillor is designated to act as a technical advisor in his village.
59 The committees, started by the CER and councils, appeared to function only superficially.
According to the CER the arrondissement has 64 committees for reforestation and fighting
bushfires. However, the informants stated that a large majority of these committees only
existed  on  paper.  In  fact  there  were  only  eight  small  tree  nurseries  in  the  whole
arrondissement.
60 The reason for this is quite clear. In view of other priorities, investment in reforestation
and for fighting bushfires had to remain small. In Kaymor the council only devoted fCFA
150 ‑250.000 a year to reforestation. In addition, the money was given directly to the CER
as  a  compensation  for  its  extension  work.  Left  without  any  financial  support,  the
committees were not enterprising at all 13. In Senegal collective action to control forest
degradation is therefore rare.
61 As mentioned in section 5, the council and the CER also assist groups, most of which are
women's groups. They initiated many such groups. According to the CER and my own
information there are at  least  100 groupements  in the arrondissement,  50 of  which are
women's groups. In the community of Kaymor there were already 26 groupements jeminin.
62 Most of these groups have obtained a plot of land and materials like seed, rakes and so on
to grow vegetables, others exploit a millet mill. In theory these groups should receive
assistance from a councillor in order to work properly. However, most councillors are
uneducated and are not able to support the group in bookkeeping and often lack the
technical expertise as far as new innovations are concerned.
63 So the councillors  failed to  manage the grain mills  properly.  Since  1976 the council
elected one village each year which received a millet mill. From the revenues a quarter
should be reserved for a replacement fund and a quarter used for an activity benefiting
the whole village. The mills were assigned to a miller and the councillor of the village
would supervise him. Between 1976 and 1987 fifteen mills,  with a total  value of  16.5
million fCFA, have been attributed to villages in the community of Kaymor. In 1987 only
in one village a mill was still running. All other mills had run into technical problems,
which had quite soon resulted in their collapse. Because the revenues from milling were
used for other goals than replacement, the women had to return to manual pounding.
Nowadays,  mills  are  only  given  to  a  women's  group  which  is  required  to  select  a
management committee composed of three women and assisted by the local councillor.
64 The involvement of the councillors in the groups may have the effect that some groups
are rather superficial. Some have been founded without much deliberation (see section 5).
Because  of  this,  some  board  members  are  only  slightly  involved  in  the  proper
management of their group. An often heard complaint is that board members borrow
from the group's funds. This happens in women's groups, but also in other groups 14.
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65 Independently,  the  chairman  and  the  vice‑chairman  of  the  council  of  Kaymor
acknowledged this  fact  and stated that  since  a  decade they preferred investment  in
infrastructure  to  financing  groups  or  economic  projects.  Investment  in  wells  or
community  buildings  can  be  made  more  easily  without  the  need  for  intensive
management. The table below shows the preference for investment in infrastructure.
66 Expenditure in 1994 by the councils in the arrondissement :
• infrastructure : 45% 
• education/youth : 19.96% 
• hydr./electricity : 15.9%
• animal vaccination pro gram : 9.9%
• health : 8.3%
67 Although many investments  have  been ill‑conceived  and ill‑performed,  many people
believe that the council tries to learn from past mistakes and the case of the millet mill
was cited. The population continues to pay its tax to the council. Every year the village
head establishes the tax list which is then checked by the council and the sous‑prefect. 
However, most often the village head keeps those who are without resources from the
list.  Because the councillors  co‑operate  and the sous‑prefect  is  not  informed,  this  list
becomes  definitive.  According  to  our  informants,  about  a  quarter  is  exempted  from
paying tax,  which explains  why the  official  number  of  inhabitants  is  below the real
number (section 2). Apart from those not mentioned on the list, all others pay their tax.
Thus, government officials have no argument that tax has not been paid by everyone.
Because the community of Kaymor has a payment rate of 100%, it receives the additional
premium of 3 million fCFA (the so‑called Fonds de Concours). Kaymor has paid its tax for
100% since  1981 ;  in  the  community  Medina Sabakh this  is  the  case  since  1991.  The
councillors are very proud of this because, according to them, people have confidence in
their performance.
68 The  conclusion  is  therefore  that  the  council  is  the  commissioned  organ  to  act  as  a
development organ,  but is  hardly able to do it  properly.  However,  the council  seems
ready  to  learn  from past  experiences  and  the  councillors  have  not  lost  confidence.
Complaining about the council is probably is not motivated by deep distrust, but is part of
personal strategies.
The rural council as guardian of land
69 Traditionally, the village chief and the autochtonous families were responsible for land
allocation. However, by the Law on the National Domain of 1964 it was stipulated that the
council is responsible for the allocation of land 15. Below several occasions dealing with
land allocation are described. From the cases it follows that the council has become an
important instrument in land allocation, and that it in this is assisted by the village head.
70 When  strangers  ask  for  land,  both  the  council  and  the  village  head  are  involved.
Sometimes both functions are performed by the same person. In most cases the request
for land is posed to the village head who then contacts the council. After the council has
decided favourably on the request, the concerned party, the village head and a councillor
go to the collective land in order to mark a parcel of land to be allocated. Most often the
eider of the neighbourhood are asked for their opinion too in order to check if there is no
claim by other families on the land (see also Bierman 1995 : 73) 16.
71 However, when local associations need land they turn directly to the council and not to
the village head, because the CER and councillors themselves have summoned them to
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create a group. Because there has been some pressure to form groups and to undertake
activities,  the  council  cannot  refuse  groups'  requests  for  land.  When  the  allocation
concerns a plot within the village residential area or close to collectively owned village
land, a problem might arise because traditionally the village head and eider decide in
such matters.
A. Case : the allocation of public village land in Sonkorong
72 In 1991 the two councillors of Sonkorong each created a women's group. Because these
groups wanted to start to grow vegetables, they turned to the council requesting a plot.
One councillor proposed to give a parcel of his own land, near by the village and suitable
for horticulture. The council agreed. The search for a plot for the other women's group
posed more problems. The second councillor decided that part of the public land of the
village  should  be  given  to  this  group.  However,  the  village  head  became angry  and
confiscated the area and prohibited any activity. He told the councillor that allocation of
public land was his affair. Since then the plot has not been cultivated. Il is not excluded
that the slave origin of the councillor may have played a role in this conflict.
73 In the following the case is described of a farmer whose land was to a large extent not
tilled.  Part  oof  it was  claimed  by  another  farmer  who  did  not  have  enough  land.
Traditionally such land could never be claimed. However, the claimant referred to the
new law and asked the council for help. However, he avoided taking his request to the
village head.
B. Casus : former extension agent who settled in the community of Kaymor
74 In the early eighties an extension worker married a village girl. He did not do this without
some calculation. Due to cuts in expenditure he had to quit his job and had to look for
other revenues. He therefore married the girl who had inherited 20 hectare of land from
her father, who had no sons and whose daughters lived elsewhere with their husbands.
Now  the  former  extension  worker  was  a  large  landowner.  Some  years  later  an
autochtonous family in Sonkorong asked the village head for part of the land because
they did not have enough to earn a living. However, the village head did not intervene
himself but suggested to contact the council. Because the extension worker had not been
able to till all the land, the council decided to give half of it to the claimant. The extension
worker was very angry and contacted the village head again. However, the village head
was afraid to intervene and so he lost the land.
75 It becomes clear that the council plays a large role in land affairs. Partly this is so because
some councillors act  as  village heads as  well.  But  we also have to take into account
another process. As regards the clearing of distant collective land, mostly used as pasture
land, neither the council nor the village head play a role. Only a generation ago, it was the
village head and the founders who decided who could clear the land (Venema 1978 : 104).
Now villagers clear distant land secretly. Although the village head or the council know
what is happening, they do not intervene. This practice has become current and even
councillors themselves join in this activity. Most often the clearing of land is in the hands
of the most wealthy and influential in the village because they have enough labourers for
clearing land. Thus the council and village head have lost control over the remaining
pasture land.
C. Casus : land clearance in Kaymor
76 Since 1977 land in the depressions near Kaymor are cleared for vegetable gardens and
orchards. Not only influential people, like the village head and the Imam, have cleared
gardens here, but recently, the women too. Although the area was used as pasture land,
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farmers with cattle did not intervene because they were landowners too. The fact that
notables themselves had cleared land, became for others the example to do likewise. The
Imam and village head have already officially registered their land, the others not yet.
77 Leasing  and  selling  of  land  occurs  frequently  in  Senegal  (Kante  1993).  In  the
arrondissement  land is  now leased too and even pawned.  Land is  increasingly seen as
privately owned property, although legally it is owned by the state. In 1995 land was
leased for about fCFA 5000‑ 15000 per ha. Even councillors have a stake in land lease. Land
can even be sold. Although land lease is discussed in public, the selling of land occurs
secretly. However, there is one case known to everybody. The council of Medina Sabakh
itself has bought land from a farmer for fCFA 11/2 million in order to extend the market
square (Bierman 1995 : 53).
78 So we see that  the introduction of  the Law on the National  Domain led to a  rather
ambiguous situation. The elected representatives try to increase their say and they seem
to succeed. But there also seems to be a power gap. Land clearers and land buyers profit
from this situation. Now even women become landowner since both the traditional elite
and the council are not strong enough to prevent these developments. This process limits
the role of the council as guardian of land.
The individual councillor as development broker
79 So  far  I  have  made  general  observations  concerning  the  council  as  a  whole  as  a
development agent. Now the individual councillors are examined. It is argued that some
councillors are more active as a development agent than others. Below the most dynamic
councillors are mentioned 17.
A. Councillor A
80 Councillor A is the son of the Imam of Kaymor, about 45 years old and with several years
of  secondary  education.  He  is  a  councillor  and  representative  of  the  council  in  the
development committee of the arrondissement and the département. The party gave him a
motorbike because of his many political activities. People whisper that in fact he rules the
council because of his intensive contacts with the chairman. Although he has a fraudulent
past,  known to everybody,  he  succeeded to  obtain a  key position in the new USAID
project. As chairman of the management committee and as chairman of the executive
committee he will  administrate billions of  francs CFA.  He is  not married and has no
interest in farming. His one and only business is politics. As secretary of the council he
receives an income for keeping the civil registration.
B. Councillor B
81 Councillor B is the son of the village chief of Kaymor and is the representative of the
youth in the council. He is in his mid‑30s. He has several years of secondary education
and expresses himself well in French and even speaks some English. He has worked for
some years in the catering sector in Gambia, but his father has asked him to come back to
assist him in his work. He was always on the hands of the Peace Corps volunteers who
have been in Kaymor for ten years now. Now he is an expert in agroforestry and resource
conservation. He is president of the committee of reforestation of Kaymor and owns a
tree nursery. Furthermore, he is the technical advisor of one of the women's groups of
Kaymor and of  a  group of  Toucouleur youngsters  in the neighbourhood who have a
collective garden.
C. Councillor C
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82 Councillor C is the village head of Thysse‑Kaymor and member of the council. He is the
president of the daira of Thysse‑Kaymor counting about 100 members.  He only has a
Koranic  education,  but  he  understands  some French.  He is  in  his  mid‑40s.  His  main
occupation is farming and livestock holding, but he is also greatly involved in politics as
he is a party official at the arrondissement level. He succeeded in becoming a member of
the USAID management committee too. His wife is the treasurer of the women's group of
Thysse‑Kaymor. He is fairly open‑minded and told the authors how the 100% tax rate was
achieved in the rural community.
83 However, not only councillors are dynamic development agents. Others too try to play a
role in development 18.
D. Former extension agent
84 He is a former extension worker who had to resign because staff was cut down. He settled
in the area and has been a large farmer for the past ten years. He has several years of
secondary  education  and  speaks  fluent  French.  He  is  about  forty  years  old.  He  is  a
member of the USAID management committee and also of the Executive Committee. He is
the secretary of the women's group of Sonkorong and of the daira of Sonkorong which is
involved  in  several  economic  activities  like  trade  in  second‑hand  farm  equipment,
fattening of oxen and so on. Furthermore, he is,  in name, the treasurer of the youth
association of Sonkorong, but actually he is the leader. When USAID appeared on the
scene, he quickly created a GIE. As already mentioned, he operates outside the official
political channels because he looks down upon party politics.
E. Local carpenter in Kaymor
85 He  grew  up  in  the  regional  centre  of  Kaffrine  where  he  followed  secondary  school
education which he did not complete. Eight years ago he returned to Kaymor where he
started his job as a carpenter. He belongs to the class of minstrels and is middle‑aged. He
has become chairman of the Chamber of Crafts of the rural community of Kaymor. He
tries to persuade people to become a member of the Chamber too. In the beginning this
was not easy because nobody believed such a membership could be in their interest. Now
the Chamber has 60 members. He is a member of the USAID management committee and
tries to obtain support of USAID for the activities of the Chamber. For this reason he
convinced the members of the Chamber to create 3 GIEs to start some common activities.
86 We can conclude that people who are dynamic as development agent have a number of
characteristics  in  common.  They  are  ail  relatively  young,  most  of  them  have  had
secondary education and they come from wealthy families. They have contacts outside
their village because they have worked elsewhere or because they are active in political
networks. For the latter the council seems to be a very good starting point. The local
development agents try to manipulate USAID, but they are, however, not in a position to
attract NGOs and can therefore not be considered as development brokers.
Decentralization and civil society
87 We have seen that several NGOs and QUANGOs are active in the arrondissement and are
linked up with about a third of the villages. In addition, the villages do not profit from
activities  financed  by  'migrant  associations'  (association  des  ressortissants).  Up  to  now
migration to towns as Dakar or Kaolack is still not common practice. One of the reasons is
that formal education has been rather limited in the area and this has in some way
withheld young men to look elsewhere for work. Primary schools can only be found in
Kaymor, Medina Sabakh, Ndiba Layene, Sonkorong, keur Bacary and keur Ayib, and the
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latter  three  villages  have  schools  with  only  two  classrooms.  There  is  no  secondary
education provision in the arrondissement, only in the seat of the district, Nioro du Rip.
The establishment of secondary school classes has only been started in the village Medina
Sabakh in 1996.
88 Nevertheless, decentralization entailed the creation of many committees and groups at a
local level, which undertake a wide range of activities 19. These groups appeared to be
composed  of  members  from  different  social  class,  even  the  boards  have  a  mixed
composition. The creation of groups and committees by NGOs, the CER and the council
contributed to this change because their only criterion for admittance was residence.
89 As  argued  in  section  2,  ranking  according  to  social  class  had  social  and  symbolic
implications,  which  effected  the  political  structure  because  some  occupations  were
reserved for the freeborn only. Now people of different castes participate in the same
groupement. We have seen this to be the case in several groups and associations. When
asked if co‑operation between members of different class would not raise problems, it
was stated that social  class at this moment is no longer relevant.  It  was argued that
education, hard work and business spirit are more important for a decent future than
caste origin.
90 Also the role of age as a criterion of access to groups has become less important. The age
of members of groups and GIEs may vary between 14 and 60. The former age groups have
disappeared and have been replaced by youth associations. But even here age may vary
between 14 and 45.
91 Even sex as a recruitment principle has become less important. The different groups as
GIEs, daira and youth associations may have members from the other sex. However, in the
boards women are in a minority. Women's groups mostly only have women as members,
but there are exceptions.
 
The compositions of the groups 20
 Youth association GIE Women’s groups Daira
Class Mixed
Mixed 
one exc.
Mixed Mixed
Age Mixed Mixed Mixed Mixed
Sex Mixed Mixed Female only mixed
92 The  decreasing  importance  of  class,  age  and sex  in  local  groups  and associations  is
general. This has been observed in the Sahel (Snrech 1988, Monimart 1989 : 54) and in
Senegal for the GIEs (Callaway and Creevey 1994).
93 Indirectly, traditional criteria continue to play a role, however. Because of the size of a
village, members of groups and GIEs are sometimes recruited from one single ward only.
In that case, the members are often from the same social class. For example, the village of
Medina Sabakh has a population of about 4000 inhabitants. It is composed of six wards. In
total it has 3 women's groups, one is composed of diambour, the second of nieenio and the
third is mixed (Bierman 1995).
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Conclusion
94 As  is  argued  by  Borhaug  (1994),  decentralization  in  Senegal  has  not  curtailed
factionalism. Sometimes a NGO avoids villages with councillors of  different tendances. 
Because shifts between tendances occur and due to absence of structural conflicts within
the community, the tendances do not hamper the council to function as a development
agency. The council has set up many grass roots organizations as GIEs, groupements and
local committees. By providing land, it promotes local small‑scale activities. However, the
role  of  the  council  as  technical  advisor  is  performed  weakly  while  its  role  as  land
guardian is undermined by developments in the wider society.
95 There are some indirect positive aspects too. Ascribed criteria of ranking have continued
to lose importance. The lower classes have had the opportunity to emancipate for several
decades now which has enfeebled the traditional hierarchy. Some slave‑born, but also
representatives  of  ethnic  minorities,  are  therefore  among  the  council  members.
Membership of grass roots organizations is no longer determined by class, age and sex.
Speaking about one's social class has become inappropriate. NGOs and party politics have
contributed to  this  social  reorganization and the development  of  civil  society.  Thus,
indirectly the council has also acted as a development promoter.
96 Some QUANQOs and NGOs link up with the council because it may act as a starting point
for establishing contacts with the villages. Some councillors, especially the younger and
educated ones, use their position to act as a contact person in order to have a say in these
agencies. As intermediaries they are not able to attract NGOs ; therefore they cannot be
considered as development brokers.
97 In the arrondissement Medina Sabakh the composition of the council by and large reflects
the local cultural values and political priorities : the members are the influential elder
among which the village heads. That is why there is no opposition between the council on
the one hand and the traditional elite on the other. Blundo (1991, 1995) also concludes
that the traditional notables are in the council,  but his analysis is made from a pure
transactional point of view. Citing Darbon, he argues that peasant leaders are recruited
among the traditional elite because they are best suited as clients of politicians (1991 :
116).  We  argue  that  councillors  have  been  elected  because  they  represent  the  local
community. A transactionalist approach quite often fails to give ample attention to the
clients themselves and to the control mechanisms operating at the local level.
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NOTES
1.The real size of population is higher than the official one. Busacker a.o. (1990) estimates
the total population as 46.712 inhabitants and the KAP‑survey has an estimation of 4260
households (ménages), which means that the number of inhabitants is roughly around
40.000.
2.The rural community of Medina Sabakh has a council with 29 members, of which 3
members are now deceased. The local village sections of the co‑operative have 8 members
in the council.
3.Africare is an American NGO. POGV stands for 'Projet d'Organisation et de Gestion
Villageois' and is funded by IFAD. PNVA stands for 'Programme National de Vulgarisation
Agricole', financed by the Senegalese government and the World Bank. ISRA is the
Institut Sénégalais de Recherches Agricoles, financed by the state and foreign donors.
Mission Norvégienne is a Norwegian NGO, financed by a Norwegian Protestant church
and the Norwegian government.
4.In 1996 PNVA and Peace Corps had Iwo field‑agents, POGV and SODEVA each one. In
1995 SODEVA also had an extension worker in Kaymor but he returned to his natal village
because he did not receive his salary. POGV is in contact with eleven villages, SODEVA
with ten, PNVA with nine and Africaire with five. Peace Corps and ISRA are working in
two villages. At last there is a Norwegian NGO, which has a project in one village only.
Since 1996 PNVA is no longer active in the arrondissement.
5.This is also the case for the council of Medina Sabakh and, in fact, for the large majority
of the rural councils in Senegal.
6.However, they can influence party politics by occupying positions in the party. So one
of the teachers of Kaymor is secrétaire administratif de coordination at the level of the
arrondissement.
7.The same accounts for the council of Medina Sabakh : only one woman and one "young
man" were in the council. Here again the woman has died and has not replaced and the
man in now 38 years old.
8.The community of Medina Sabakh counts 58 villages, 16 of them do have one or more
councillors. The largest villages have more than one member (Medina Sabakh, Payoma,
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Ndiba Ndiayene, Diguirnar). Payoma, however is overrepresented. The regional
distribution is as follows : Medina Sabakh : 4, Payoma : 5, Ndiba Diayene : 3, FafiIa : 2,
Djiquene : 2, Pakala : 2, Sanghab : 2, 9 villages : 1.
9.For example the council of Medina Sabakh has one artisan and Iwo slave‑bom only, the
other members (23) are all freeborn.
10.The council of Medina Sabakh has only one member not being Wolof (a Manding),
although it counts three Peulh and six Toucouleur villages, among which a large village
(Diguimar).
11.The remaining members are : representatives of the professional categories
(agriculture, animal husbandry, handicraft) : 3 ; women's groups : 2 ; youth groups : 1 ;
school committee : 1 ; representatives of geographical zones : 3 ; representatives of
NGOs : ?
12.In 1993‑95 the budget was respectively fCFA 5.200.000, 5.300.000 and 6.000.000. The
chairman and the vice‑chairman obtain a renumeration for their work and take 15 and
10% of the budget respectively, so that a quarter disappears as fixed costs.
13.In fact the committees are dependant of gifts from World Food Program (PAM) and
from the Ministère des Eaux et Forêts, but these agencies did not help in a systematic way
(Venema a.o. 1996 : 7).
14.In Sonkorong in 1995 both groupements ftminins were bankrupt. These groups had
already run into financial difficulties earlier, resulting in a reshuffiing of the board, but
without success. But also a religious group in Sonkorong had financial problems. In
addition, the youth association of Kaymor was in fact bankrupt because of borrowing
from the cash.
15.We are here referring to the Loi sur la Domaine Nationale of 1964. Except for the forét
classée in the arrondissement ail the land is in the zone des terroirs. Here the state owns the
land, but the usufruct of land was given back to the former owners. Under specific
conditions land could be cleared, inherited and expropriated. This is decided by the rural
council, with the local authorities acting as supervisors.
16.The village head also controls the access of cattle of strangers to the village weil and so
indirectly decides who can make use of the pasture land, although in theory this should
be decided by the council together with the sous‑prefect (see section 2).
17.In Medina Sabakh one councillor is mentioned to be very active. He is a farmer and
also Imam of the village, although not the principal Imam. He is chairman of the local
saving society, the Caisse Populaire, board member of the OIE of the ward Santhiabi and
chairman of the Federation of OIEs in the arrondissement. His wife is president of the
women's group of Santhiabi. Before the reform of the cooperatives he was the chairman
of the co‑operative of Medina Sabakh. He has had a thorough Koranic schooling.
18.In Medina Sabakh a teacher in French at the primary school was quite dynamic. He
was the president of the OIE of Oawane and also the president of the board of visitors of
the local saving bank, la Caisse Populaire. He was well‑known because of his splendid
orchard.
19.According to an estimation in 1988 about 10% of the rural population of Senegal would
be involved in groups (Dramé 1996 : 6). This holds true for the arrondissement with a
percentage of about 15‑20%, but if we include traditional groups such as daira. tontines too,
the percentage would be far higher.
20.We studied the youth‑association of Sonkorong and Kaymor, the women's groups of
Thysse‑Kymor, Kaymor, of Sonkorong (2) and of N'Dakhar, aGIE in Sonkorong and in
Medina Sabakh (Gawane) and the two daira of Sonkorong.
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